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COMMENTS
VERTICAL TERRITORIAL RESTRAINTS AND THE
PER SE CONCEPT
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Vertical Territorial and Customer Restraints
Present antitrust treatment of agreements contemplating vertical territorial
and customer restraints has been the subject of continuing controversy among
legal scholars. Vertical territorial and customer restraints are limitations of the
area within which, and, the customers to whom, distributors and retailers may
sell the manufacturer's product.
In explanation of the ramifications of such a restraint and the terminology
that is commonly employed in cases and commentaries on this subject, consider
the following hypothetical situation:
X manufactures widgets. His distribution system is vertically integrated
by ownership, that is to say, that X owns all of the outlets that are used to
market his product. Y manufactures didgets, a product similar in function and
use to widgets. Y uses a franchise system of distribution. He does not own the
outlets which distribute and sell his product. Y is related to his distributors and
retailers by contract arrangements.
Assume from the outset that widgets and didgets are reasonable substitutes
for one afiother. Therefore, X and Y are competitors. X's outlets have an ad-
vantage over those of Y. Y's dealers must compete against each other as well as
against X's dealers. Using more formalistic terminology, Y's dealers must meet
intra-brand competition among fellow sellers of Y's product. X's dealers need
only be concerned with inter-brand competition with Y's dealers. Y decides to
impose vertical territorial limitations, or in other wdrds, to divide his sales areas
and to grant an exclusive franchise to one dealer in each area. His ostensible
motive for taking such action is to improve his position vis-a-vis X. Note that
by revising his marketing network Y is destroying intra-brand competition-
an anti-competitive effect. If, as is assumed, widgets and didgets are reasonably
interchangeable, and, by virtue of increased efficiency resulting from market
division Y can afford to charge a lower price for didgets, X may be stimulated
to respond by reducing the price of Widgets. Therefore, inter-brand price
competition has been enhanced-a pro-competitive effect. The term "pro-com-
petitive effect" as hereinafter used, means an effect which resembles a result
that would follow from actual competition. One critic will assert that Y's busi-
1. It is asserted that a manufacturer can distribute his product less expensively when
he has only one outlet in each sales area. He can avoid duplication of expenses and effort.
He can properly plan for the future. Consequently, the manufacturer can lower his prices
and still obtain the same profit as he did before market division. For a more detailed
explanation, see the text accompanying footnotes 102-108.
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ness conduct is always more harmful than beneficial to competition. 2 Others
maintain that Y's actions are justified by business necessity, and that the effect
on competition may be good or bad depending on the circumstances in each
case.3 The former advocates believe that market division should be illegal per se,
that is, unlawful without elaborate inquiry into business justification. The op-
posing position is that business justification should be weighed against any
undesirable effects to determine whether the restraint is reasonable in terms of
antitrust goals. Another authority argues that all such vertical restraints are in-
nocuous, and should almost always be treated as lawful.4 At present, the law is
such that Y's conduct is "per se" unlawful when Y's outlets are independent
dealers, and unlawful in many instances when they are agents of Y.5
Perhaps the only point of agreement among those who have spoken on
the subject is that the law, as it now exists, fails to achieve the ends sought by
antitrust law, and fails to provide realistic regulation of business conduct.0
In defense of the present law, it has been stated that the goals of antitrust are
nebulous; 7 economic theories of competition are too abstract to shape prag-
matic anitrust policy; 8 and the judiciary lacks the time and expertise to effec-
tively extract and resolve complex issues presented in voluminous records.0 In
view of the foregoing circumstances, the need for a more easily workable rubric
for deciding cases of vertical territorial and customer restraints is compelling.
The purpose of this comment is to relate in substance the competing positions
of several commentators, and to suggest areas susceptible of compromise, in the
hope that a more successful approach to this type of antitrust problem might
be realized.
B. The Background and Present Legal Treatment of Vertical
Territorial and Customer Restraints
Prior to 1964, courts generally upheld vertical territorial and customer
restraints which had the purpose and effect of facilitating legitimate business
2. See Comanor, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its
Aftermath, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1419 (1968).
3. See, e.g., von Kalinowski, The Per Se Doctrine as an Emerging Philosophy of Anti-
trust Law, 11 U.C.L.A. Law Rev. 569 (1964); Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After
Sealy and Schwinn, 12 A.T. Bull. 1181 (1967).
4. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and The Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 75 Yale L.J. 373 (1966).
5. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) for the present
law. See also Bork, supra note 4. Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66
Colum. L. Rev. 625 (1966); P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis, 236-40 (1967).
6. See, e.g., Comanor, supra note 2; Zeidman, The Growth and Importance of Fran-
chising-Its Impact on Small Business, 12 A.T. Bull. 1191 (1967).
7. See P. Areeda, supra note 5 at 240.
8. See Markham, Current Decisions in Antitrust, 12 A.T. Bull. 851, 855-56 (1967).
9. See McLaren, Marketing Limitations on Independent Distributors and Dealers-
Prices, Territories, Customers and Handling of Competitive Products, 13 A.T. Bull. 164,
168-69 (1968).
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ends.10 The dicta of United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. 1 deterred
Sherman Act prosecutions,'12 so long as restrictive covenants were found to be
ancillary to justifiable business goals.1 3 The relevant inquiry was whether the
restraint was such that it merely afforded fair protection to the interests of the
party in favor of whom it was given, without prejudice to the public interest.
14
In 1963, the Supreme Court was, for the first time, presented with the opportu-
nity to hold vertical territorial and customer restraints illegal per se, without
inquiry into business justifications.' 5 The Court refused to affirm the lower
court's summary judgment of per se illegality, on the ground that sufficient
understanding of the economic and "business stuff" of these agreements, as well
as their actual impact on competition, was lacking.' 6 Whether such agreements
have the requisite pernicious effect on competition and the lack of any redeeming
virtue to be fairly classified as illegal per se, could not at that time be deter-
mined. In 1967, however, the Supreme Court apparently believed that it had
acquired sufficient knowledge of the "business stuff" of vertical territorial and
customer restraints to warrant a holding of per se illegality. In United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., the Supreme Court held that where the manufacturer
fails to retain title, dominion, and risk with respect to his product, the imposi-
tion of vertical territorial and customer restraints upon distributors or retailers
is illegal per se.-7 If the dealer's position and function are indistinguishable from
that of agent or salesman, the legality of the restraint may be determined by
reference to the rule of reason,'8 which comprehends business excuse as a de-
fense. In addition to the agency requirement, the restraint may not exceed
limits reasonably necessary to achieve a pro-competitive business end.
19 There
must be vigorous inter-brand competition and a demonstrated need to employ
exclusive franchising to meet such competition.20 Also, it is probably necessary
that the franchisee sells rival brands, and that there is sufficient interchange-
ability among the competing products to assure a satisfactory supply for other
dealers in the market.21 Furthermore, the manufacturer is obliged to demonstrate
10. See, e.g., Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied 317 U.S. 695 (1943); Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 176
F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied 383 U.S. 948 (1950).
11. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
12. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1955).
13. An example of a justifiable ancillary restraint is a partnership. In the context of
of territorial division, a justifiable business goal would be lower prices through efficient dis-
tribution.
14. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
15. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
16. Id.
17. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
18. Id. 381. See also text accompanying notes 40-46 for an explanation of the "per se
rule." It should be noted that there need not be a formal agency as well as an arrangement
which in essence resembles an agency relationship.
19. 388 U.S. 380-81.
20. Id. at 381.
21. Id.
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that the net effect of the restraint will preserve or enhance overall competition
in the relevant product market.22 In summary, it may be stated that a manu-
facturer may select and franchise those to whom, alone, he will sell his product,
if there is sufficient inter-brand competition, and the restraint stops at that
point.23 Beyond this, it is clear only that territorial and customer restraints are
unlawful per se in the context of sale for resale marketing.24 If the distribution
arrangement is in substance an agency, however, it is difficult to predict whether
the agreement will escape prohibition through the narrow, ill-defined, and
difficult to prove rule of reason exception.
25
C. Business and Economics Background
One of the infirmities of the law as it now stands is the lack of clarity in
the guidelines prescribed in Schwinn for lawful territorial and customer re-
straints. How strong must interbrand competition be? How severe may the
impact on competition be before the restraint becomes unreasonable? How is
that impact measured? How is necessity for the restraint determined? These
questions, and others can be responded to only with conjecture and speculation,
leaving the legal position of franchise operators unsettled. The Supreme Court
regards franchising and confinement of distribution as an "unusual method
which may be permissible in an appropriate and impelling competitive setting,
since most merchandise is distributed by means of purchase and sale."20 It can
therefore be assumed that only rare, narrow, and exigent circumstances, such
as those in Sckwinn,27 where "competitive giants" posed difficult competitive
problems to their smaller rival, will justify territorial and customer limitations.
But the scope of this exception may be greater than it would appear to be at
first glance. Franchising is the fastest growing distributional vehicle in our
economy.28 It has been estimated that there are more than 750 franchising
operations, encompassing 450,000 outlets, generating gross income of 70 billion
dollars, or 10% of our gross national product.2 The promise of growth of
franchising is clouded by its dubious legal status, since the great majority of
franchises employ territorial restraints. 30 If, as it appears from the Sclwinn
opinion,3' the Supreme Court will uphold territorial and customer restraints
22. Id. at 380-82.
23. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
24. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
25. Id. It should also be noted that price fixing is unlawful even though an agency
arrangement is being used. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
26. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967).
27. Id. at 376.
28. See Zeidman, supra note 6 at 1196-97.
29. New York Times, Sec. 3, p. 1, July 9, 1967.
30. In a recent survey 57 of 69 respondents stated that they use territorial restraints.
Partners For Profit, A Study of Franchising, 51 (American Management Assoc., Inc., New
York 1966). But note that not all franchises use a consignment arrangement. Sometimes the
francisee merely has bought the right to use the manufacturer's name.
31. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 356, 379 (1967).
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only in extraordinary circumstances, the Court may well be undermining anti-
trust goals in mistaken reliance upon economic theory.
Economic models are characteristically employed by the judiciary to
demonstrate the desirability of vigorous competition as the best market econ-
omy.3 2 But perfect competition is not a social actuality. Once it is conceded
that markets are imperfect, conclusions as to the relative desirability or com-
petitiveness of market structures are difficult to formulate.33 Simplifying as-
sumptions render economic analysis less useful as a guide for antitrust policy,
because the workings of the actual market mechanism are poorly understood.
Further difficulty arises when legality turns on phrases such as "lessening of
competition," which in neither law nor economics has a clear definition.3 4 The
result is that men lacking expertise endeavor to apply abstract and often
inappropriate economic theory to little understood competitive realities.
Beyond the vague aspiration to "maximum social and economic welfare" it is
difficult to say exactly which goals antitrust policy seeks to achieve. Efficiency in
production and distribution; proper allocation of resources, output and wealth;
development, innovation and progress are in some combination the accepted ends
of antitrust.35 Economists disagree as to the relative importance of these goals,
and as to the best way to realize them.36 It is no wonder that judges have mis-
conceptions as to what "competition" should be, and as to how antitrust policy
can be implemented.37 On the other hand, although the fact that competition is
impeded may or may not dispose of the question of a given practice's desir-
ability, it is often asserted that ordinary notions of competition are the closest
we can come to a comprehensible standard for ordering the conduct of busi-
ness.8 s It is also conceded that the issues revolving about the impact on compe-
tition of territorial and customer restraints are too complex for the courts to
grapple with. Does this mean that "per se illegality" upon a finding of restraint
of competition is the only workable formula available td the courts? The answer
is clearly no. Antitrust law is replete with examples of lawful restraints of com-
petition30 Every contract in some way restrains competition. Yet most contracts
are not condemned by the Sherman Act. A brief examination of the Sherman
Act, and the vehicles used for its application, the "rule of reason," and the "per
se rule," may provide some insight into the problems that assail a court hearing
a vertical territorial and customer restraint case.
32. See Markham, supra note 8.
33. Id. at 857-58.
34. See Bernhard, Competition in Law and in Economics, 12 A.T. Bull. 1099 (1967).
35. Id., 1100.
36. See P. Samuelson, Monopolistic Competition Theory: Studies in Impact, 107-8
(New York, 1967).
37. See Bernhard, supra note 34 at 1099-1116.
38. See Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 377 (1965).
39. See, e.g., Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899);
United States v. Colgate and Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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D. The Sherman Act: The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Rule
The purpose of the Sherman Act is the preservation of free competition
as the rule of trade.40 It is presupposed that unfettered interplay of market
forces will result in optimum allocation of resources, economic progress and
development, low prices and high quality, while insuring the preservation of
societal institutions.41 To assure free competition, the policy of limiting undue
aggrandizement of economic power in private hands is pursued.4 2 Monopoliza-
tion is proscribed because it creates inordinate power over price, production,
quality and to whom the product is sold.
43
Beyond the proscription of activities which are obviously socially undesir-
able,44 the Sherman Act has been interpreted as prohibiting only unreasonable
restraints of trade.45 At common law, agreements that achieved socially com-
mendable ends were upheld, notwithstanding provisions for necessary incidental
restraints.46 One criterion for decision has been whether the agreement led to
unreasonably excessive power over price or production. 47 Agreements creating
such power are unlawful. Those not within this common law prohibition can
be justified by reason.48 The relevant inquiry has been whether the agreement
diminished existing competition, threatened monopoly, or used means unneces-
sarily restrictive in view of the ends sought. 49 A classic interpretation of the
Sherman Act and the "rule of reason" as a device for its administration was
offered by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States:
Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade
restrains . . . . The true test of legality is whether the restraint im-
posed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes com-
petition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. . . . The
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought
to be attained, are all relevant facts . . because knowledge of intent
may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequencesr 0
It is clear from the preceding statement that promotion of self interest alone will
not suffice to invoke the rule of reason. Conduct must be found to be com-
patible with the statutory concern for preservation and enhancement of compe-
40. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4, 5 (1958).
41. See von Kalinowski, supra note 3.
42 See Bernhard, supra note 34.
43. See United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
44. Such activities include price fixing, group boycotts, tying agreements, various hori-
zontal restraints and monopolization.
45. See Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
46. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
47. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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tition. Demonstration of downward pressure on prices, cheaper and more
efficient production, and any other factor that might lead to greater satisfaction
of economic and social needs, would apparently place the disputed restraint
within the rule of reason, and consequently without the per se rule.
The per se rule, the antithesis of the rule of reason, applies to agreements
or practices which because of their adverse effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming qualities are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry into the precise harm they caused
or the business justification for their use.51 Among the practices held to be illegal
per se are vertical and horizontal price fixing,52 tying arrangements, 8 group
boycotts, 4 horizontal territorial restraints,55 and most recently vertical ter-
ritorial restraints in other than an agency context.5 6 One cogent interpretation
of the per se rule, is that the proper judicial inquiry is with regard to the
purpose and effect of the challenged restraint." The fact that the general con-
duct within which the specific challenged restraint falls, has on the basis of
experience proven to be anti-competitive in most cases, allows for a fair pre-
sumption of illegality in the particular case. But where a defendant can demon-
strate that the purpose and effect of the restraint are innocuous or pro-competi-
tive, he should be able to escape from the per se rule.58
The foregoing interpretation of the per se rule is not the only way to
characterize its operation. In practice, it is very difficult if not impossible to
vitiate the presumption of illegality.5 9 The "lacking any redeeming virtue"
element of the per se formula is apparently overlooked. 60 This is not surprising
in view of some of the purposes underlying the per se rule. Courts are not well
equipped to deal with long, complex records which are common in antitrust
cases. 61 In the attempt to simplify, shorten, and eliminate where practicable,
antitrust litigation, the Supreme Court is defining an increasing variety of
51. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4, 5 (1958).
52. See Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
53. See Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Susser v.
Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964).
54. See Radiant Burners, Inc., v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
55. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
56. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
57. See von Kalinowski supra note 3. A case authority for this position is United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
58. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
59. See United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) where the Supreme Court
made the dubious economic judgment that a typing contract was per se unlawful, finding
the requisite leverage in the product's uniqueness rather than examining the manufacturer's
share of the market. See also, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951), another much criticized decision.
60. See von Kalinowski, supra note 3 at 582.
61. The record in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), was
composed of 23 volumes, and filed 60 days before oral arguments were heard. See McLaren,
supra note 9 at 161, who notes that the Court lacks the physical abilities to handle anti-
trust cases.
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restraints as per se violations of the Sherman Act.0 2 This also decreases the cost
of investigating factual circumstances which are difficult to prove. Another
virtue of the per se rule is that it provides a measure of clarity and certainty
in a field where it is much needed. Businessmen need a clear and reliable guide
for their conduct. They must necessarily speculate at what is "reasonable."
They can understand, predict and act upon a clear per se boundary. For the
same reason of clarity, the per se rule is a more effective deterrent than the rule
of reason. Antitrust suits take so long, involve so many people and have such
drastic consequences, that it may well be fair and reasonable to sweep in some
innocuous or beneficial conduct to obtain certainty, and brevity of results.
03
Notwithstanding the pragmatic advantages of the per se rule, a very real
danger inheres in the recent trend toward extending its scope. The economic
judgment that underlies a finding that a general business practice is usually
anti-competitive and lacks redeeming qualities should be an informed decision.
The consequences of such a judgment are severe and far reaching. Several anti-
trust experts believe that per se decisions are too often grounded on dubious
judicial economic judgments. 64 In deciding whether to apply the per se rule to
a given practice, the court should be well acquainted with actual business
circumstances, and the predictable impact on competition in the relevant market.
The court should demonstrate that experience has shown that the practice is so
harmful that the gains to be derived from its outright prohibition clearly out-
weigh the losses, based not upon abstract theory, but upon business realities. 5
II. SoME GENERAL CRITICISM OF THE PRESENT LEGAL TREATMENT
or VERTICAL TERRITORIAL AND CUSTOMER RESTRAINTS
A. The Agency-Resale Dichotomy
The Supreme Court, in White Motor Co. v. United States refused to hold
territorial and customer restrictions illegal per se.66 The rationale for this de-
cision was that the court lacked sufficient understanding of business circum-
stances, and the likely impact on competition surrounding such restraints. 7
But four years later, in United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co. the Court did
hold territorial and customer restrictions illegal per se.08 There was no evidence
adduced that Schwinn's franchise program injured any dealer, distributor, com-
62. See Elman, supra note 5.
63. It would seem to be unfair to award treble damages against a manufacturer who,
because of nebulous guidelines provided by the rule of reason, run slightly afoul of the
Sherman Act. On the other hand, it is also inequitable to punish a manufacturer' whose
business conduct appears undesirable upon superficial examination, when such conduct is in
fact socially and economically desirable.
64. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 4; Elman, supra note 5.
65. See von Kalinowski, supra note 3.
66. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
67. Id.
68. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
COMMENTS
petition in the bicycle market or any other relevant interest.69 In fact, there are
several economic arguments, indicating that in many instances territorial and
customer restraints are actually pro-competitive, or at least not clearly anti-
competitive in effect.70 Unfortunately, the focus of the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in the Schwinn case, is apparently not upon the effect of territorial limitations
on competition as reflected in price and output, but upon their interference with
the freedom of distributors and retailers. In raising the agency-resale dichotomy
for deciding when the per se rule becomes operational, the Court draws distinc-
tions that do not serve to deter pernicious practices and leave commendable ones
unaffected. There is no basis in logic or experience to conclude that social
detriment is less onerous when accomplished in the form of agency, rather than
resale arrangements.71 To extend the per se rule to reach distribution arrange-
ments such as Schwinn's by saying that it limits the freedom of dealers is to
beg the question. All contracts have a limiting effect on competition. The fact
that a dealer's freedom of action is impeded after title has passed does not at
all bear on the questions of whether competition has been unduly restricted,
whether the purpose and effect of the restraint are anti-competitive, and whether
the restraint lacks any redeeming virtue.7 2 The answers to these questions must
determine the propriety and the legal status of suspect business conduct.
In addition to the foregoing criticism of the agency-resale dichotomy based
on the rationale of the per se rule, another practical consideration should be
noted. There may in some instances be difficulty in determining whether the
arrangement is actually an agency. The issue is whether two parties are more
like independent businessmen, or like parts of a single economic entity.73
Although the Supreme Court threatens to look past form to business realities
when dealers no longer resemble agents, 74 there can be confusing differences
between legally and economically recognized business units, which may give
both courts and businessmen difficulty.75 It has been held that a proprietor of
a small hardware store carrying a variety of items is the agent of General
Electric when he sells its bulbs.76 A more recent case, however, held that a
69. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382-88 (1967) (Mr.
justice Stewart concurring in part and dissenting in part demonstrates that Schwinn had
ample business excuse for its distribution policies).
70. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 4; Lewis & Handcock, The Franchise System of Distri-
bution (1963) (A study prepared for the Small Business Administration); Zimmerman,
supra note 3.
71. In fact, the Supreme Court stated in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964)
that it would not allow vertical price fixing through consignment systems, since this would
mean that the legality of a distribution arrangement would turn on form or clever draftsman-
ship, rather than substance.
72. See Elman, supra note 5; von Kalinowski, supra note 3.
73. E.g., Dealings between a parent corporation and its subsidiary are sometimes held
unlawful combinations under section one of the Sherman Act, but some sign of independence
such as separate incorporation is probably necessary.
74. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381 (1967).
75. See, e.g., P. Areeda, supra note 5; Note 81 Harv. L. Rev. 235 (1967).
76. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
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filling station operator is not the agent of the oil company whose gas is his
principal stock in trade.77 In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
7 8 it
appears that a wholesale distributor is an agent when he receives goods on con-
signment-as did the aforementioned filling station operator. Generally, con-
certed action by persons within a single business enterprise is not a contract,
combination, or conspiracy within section one of the Sherman Act.70 The busi-
ness enterprise is regarded as a unit. It cannot combine with its officers or
employees, who are its only means for acting. The problem is defining "business
enterprise," and rationalizing the language of the cases to determine whether in
a given instance the agreeing parties are part of a single economic entity. The
Schwinn case fails to provide guidelines for deciding when a distributor or
dealer is legally categorized as an agent of the manufacturer.
It is also questionable whether the policy judgments underlying the agency-
resale dichotomy are valid. Proponents of the Schwinn decision might argue that
the Supreme Court is reasonably endeavoring to apply the per se rule wherever
practicable and fair. Exceptions to antitrust theories requiring pure competition
are, however, obviously necessary to allow for cooperation among those working
within the same economic unit.80 So the Court limits lawful territorial and
customer restraints to the clearly identifiable area of consignment distribution.
The argument is that reasonable restrictions imposed by the manufacturer on
his consignee are justifiable to the extent that the manufacturer is responsible
for his product. The manufacturer has an interest in maintaining good will.
Service and repairs are integral elements of good will. The manufacturer is also
responsible for the product's condition, insofar as he may be liable in tort for
damages. But it is unrealistic to assume that a manufacturer does not have
these same interests after title has passed to a distributor or dealer. He still
must make good on advertising promises and warranties. His marginal revenue
or maximum profit will still depend on the quantity that retailers of his product
can sell. So it would seem that a manufacturer is justified in exercising some
direction over the marketing of his product regardless of whether title has
passed.8 '
In terms of the freedom of distributors and dealers, the Schwinn court's
reasoning is apparently that the dealer if he chooses can remain free so long
as there are enough competing products to supply him. If he wants to agree to
a consignment arrangement he may choose to do so knowing that he is subject
to reasonable restriction by his principal. But, as predicted by Mr. Justice
77. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964). Note that he was not the agent
of the oil company for purposes of price fixing, but he might be an agent for purposes of
territorial division.
78. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
79. See P. Areeda, supra note 5 at 236 for an in depth analysis.
80. Alpha Distributing Co. v. Jack Daniel's Distillery 207 F. Supp. 136 (N.. Cal.
1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1962).
81. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 392-93 (1967) (Mr. justice
Stewart concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162
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Stewart in his dissent in Sclzwinn, one result has been the destruction 'of many
distributorships and dealerships.8 2 The agency-resale dichotomy has injured
small business more than it has benefitted it.8 3 Individuals, heretofore inde-
pendent dealers, may now find themselves agents, employees or unemployed.
The rule in Sclzwinn thus destroys small business by encouraging vertical
integration by ownership; hurts middlesized manufacturers who cannot afford
to integrate; and hurts the consumer by depriving him of the added competition
that would obtain by allowing marketing restrictions after title passes, where
warranted by business necessities.8 4
B. Some Justification of Vertical Territorial Restraints
Since the agency-resale formula of Schwinn appears to lack justification it
becomes apparent that the proper inquiry might be whether per se treatment
of all vertical, territorial and customer restraints is warranted. Other possible
alternatives are per se treatment with several clearly defined exceptions, or an
exclusive rule of reason approach.
In deciding the proper procedural framework for evaluating territorial and
customer restrictions it is necessary to start with basic assumptions as to anti-
trust policy. The objectives of competition, more than merely competition itself,
should circumscribe the lawful boundaries of business conduct.85 Therefore, the
emphasis should be on the effect of the restraint upon price; production and dis-
tribution efficiency; output; and allocation of resources, output and wealth.8 6
The tendency of a restraint to promote innovation and development, and to
satisfy consumer wants, is also not insignificant.87 One further assumption is
that economic models of pure competition are so far divorced from reality that
they confuse rather than simplify appraisal of business practices. Each seller
has some degree of power to dominate the market due to location, product dif-
ferentiation, and reputation.8 8 This is not undesirable to the extent that concen-
tration of economic power generates greater efficiency, whose benefits may be
passed to the consumer in the form of lower prices.8 9 The same may be said
with regard to innovation and economic development and its attendant satis-
faction of societal needs. 90 Yet empirical studies indicate that in many industries
82. Id. at 394. It may be argued contra, that franchising hurts small unfranchised busi-
nesses. One response is that antitrust has no interest in saving inefficient businesses to the
detriment of the consuming public unless the challenged restraint is found to be anti-competi-
tive in overall effect.
83. See Keck, Alternative Distribution Techniques-Franchising, Consignment, Agency,
and Licensing, 12 A.T. Bull. 177 (1968).
84. The business circumstances in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365, 382-85, 392-94 (1967), exemplify this assertion.
85. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 320 (1949) (separate opinion
of Mr. justice Douglas).
86. See Markham, supra note 8.
87. See J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (1950).
88. See Samuelson, supra note 36.
89. See J. Schumpter, supra note 87.
90. See J. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (1967).
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concentration is greater than that necessary for the achievement of commendable
goals.91 Consequently, it is impossible to avoid the arduous task of balancing
pro- and anti-competitive effects, if the objective is to reconcile each decision
with antitrust policy. Courts are not well equipped to perform this function.
Perhaps then, the Schwinn decision is justifiable in terms of common if not
economic sense.0 2 But it would seem that logic and fairness demand that the
rationale of facility of judicial administration give way to persuasive economic
justification for territorial and customer restraints, that can actually be demon-
strated.
The great majority of franchising operations use territorial and customer
restraints. 93 Perhaps many can rearrange the legal terminology of their distri-
butional agreements to comport with the requirements of Sctwinn. But it is
difficult to rationalize its inevitably disruptive effect on franchising, a socially
desirable method of marketing.94 In justification of territorial and customer
restraints it has been argued that where inter-brand competition is vigorous,
restriction of intra-band competition is excusable, especially where competitors
are stronger integrated companies which enjoy freedom from intra-band competi-
tion, and therefore higher profit margins.9 5 To many manufacturers, the fran-
chise system is the only economically practicable substitute to vertical integra-
tion.96 Franchising is a legal concept which facilitates the pooling of the capital
and experience of a large organization with the zeal and the knowhow of local
operation.97 While providing the advantages of bigness, franchising allows the
small businessman to retain ownership rather than employee status.9 8 The con-
sumer benefits by receiving quality, service, and prices competitive with those
of chain or vertically integrated operation. The manufacturer derives the bene-
fit of the retailer's peculiar knowledge of local conditions, expertise in servicing
the product, and local good will. Manufacturer owned outlets take longer and
cost more to establish. 9 The dealer also benefits, by obtaining the franchiser's
capital, managerial acumen, modern techniques, economy of large scale purchas-
ing, advertising and prestige. 100 Therefore, it appears that franchising has many
91. See 3. Bain, Barriers to New Competition, p. 111 (1956).
92. See Markham, supra note 8.
93. See supra note 30.
94. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967) (Mr. Justice
Stewart concurring in part and dissenting in part).
95. See, e.g., Lewis & Handcock, supra note 70.
96. See Zeidman, supra note 6. Chain operations have greater competitive power than
their smaller rivals. With the advent in the 1950's and 1960's of large shopping centers, small
independents could no longer effectively compete with their larger adversaries. To survive,
they had to stress quality, competitive prices, and sophisticated marketing techniques. The
answer for these small independents was franchising, which provided at once the requisite
capital and marketing system.
97. See Rowe, Introduction: The Significance of Franchising in 1967, 12 A.T. Bull.
1167 (1967).
98. See Lewis & Handcock, supra note 70.
99. See Zeidman, supra note 6 at 1192-94.
100. Id.
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social and business advantages over alternative methods of marketing. 101 Never-
theless, the future of franchises using territorial restrictions is clouded by the
dubious legal status of such restraints.
Assuming that franchising is a commendable business practice the relevant
inquiry in terms of antitrust goals is whether territorial division is necessary
for successful franchising, and whether its effect on competition is so harmful
that it must, nonetheless, be prohibited. In this regard it should be noted that
vertical territorial restrictions may actually create conditions which are ordinar-
ily expected to flow only from vigorous competition. 10 2 They enable a manu-
facturer to derive the benefits of a stable, reliable relationship with his retailers.
This in turn results in marketing efficiency.10 3 Market division, it is argued,
facilitates planning, and consequently efficiency, by allowing the manufacturer
to accurately estimate how much he must produce to meet demand and to avoid
waste; to reduce the cost of promotion and distribution by averting duplication
of effort and expenses; and to more easily control the quality and goodwill of
his product.10 4 Furthermore, it assures optimal sales effort and market cover-
age; 10 5 obviates the "free ride problem;"'1 6 encourages exchanges of informa-
tion;' 0 7 and minimizes the cost and likelihood of dissatisfaction with service. 0
All of the preceding efficiencies mean that the marginal cost of producing and
distributing the manufacturer's product is decreased. If any part of this saving
is passed on to the consumer, the effect is pro-competitive. Another desirable
outgrowth of territorial division is the freeing of dealers of relatively weak man-
ufacturers to concentrate on competition with their inter-brand rivals. If this
increases inter-brand competition, and the resulting impact on the market price
outweighs the deleterious effect on intra-brand competition, the consuming pub-
101. See Jones, The Growth and Importance of Franchising and the Role of Law, 12
A.T. Bull. 717 (1967).
102. See Markham, supra note 8.
103. See Zimmerman, supra note 3 at 1181-83.
104. See Bork, supra note 4 at 429-35.
105. Territorial division frees the dealer from the burden of meeting intra-brand
competition, and therefore allows him to concentrate on maximum exploitation of his sales
area. The dealer is assured of sufficient supply at a given price, and an ample market to
cover, assuring the success of an investment. The dealer knows that he will recapture,
through sales, all of the money and sales effort (which includes advertising, promotion,
service, information, goodwill, and training of personnel) that he has expended. This
attracts dealers to weak manufacturers, a pro-competitive effect.
106. Absent territorial limitation, there is nothing to prevent one dealer from taking
advantage of the sales effort of his intra-brand rivals. It is doubly unfair since the "free
rider" has saved money on selling costs, and therefore can underprice his competitors.
107. When a dealer obtains information valuable to the manufacturer and to other
resellers, he will not be reluctant to relate it if he knows that it can't result in competitive
detriment. Antitrust policy should facilitate mobility of information which may lead to
efficiency or innovation.
108. Market division prevents distant dealers from taking a "free ride" with regard to
the service of a local dealer. Also, the customer is more likely to receive good service when
one dealer is responsible, and eager to retain his clientele. Furthermore, the likelihood of
selling defective products is lessened when a dealer knows that he will have to fix it. For a
more thorough analysis which complements notes 105-8, see Bork, supra note 4 at 429-35.
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lic benefits, and the courts err in preventing the public from having these
benefits. 0 9
One of the most persuasive proponents of the lawfulness of vertical terri-
torial limitations is Robert H. Bork,1 0 who asserts that most vertical restraints
should be lawful. His theory is based on the ultimate values underlying the
Sherman Act, preservation of competition and satisfaction of consumer wants
as they may be promoted by increased efficiency and output, and decreased
prices."' The law, he maintains, is aimed not at precluding efficient combina-
tion, but only those which adversely affect price, output or quality.112 Manu-
facturers will try to maximize profits by equating marginal revenue with
marginal cost. Market division will be employed to distribute products more
efficiently. The resulting reduction in cost and increase in efficiency of distribu-
tion will generate lower prices, increased output and better service.113 There is
no reason to believe that market division will deflect manufacturers from equat-
ing marginal cost and marginal revenue, because profit maximization depends
on it. Since it is to the detriment of manufacturers to divide markets to protect
inefficient retailers, it is fair to assume that the purpose of these agreements is
to enhance marketing efficiency."" The economic judgments of manufacturers
are probably more often correct than those of the judiciary. Therefore, Bork
concludes, vertical restraints which do not affect price or output should not be
within the purview of antitrust regulation."5r
Opponents of territorial restrictions have also offered persuasive arguments
to support their position. They argue that manufacturers imposing territorial
restraints are not primarily concerned wth marketing efficiency, but rather act-
ing to eliminate disruptive price competition."16 Manufacturers are emphasizing
the image of their products by enhancing the prestige of their dealers, the ob-
ject being an artificially high price."17 One of the most persuasive advocates of
per se illegality for territorial restraints is William S. Comanor who agrees with
Bork, that the sale-agency dichotomy in Schwinn is unwarranted. They seem to
agree on nothing else. Comanor takes the polar position to that of Bork, assert-
109. See Zimmerman, supra note 3, whose inquiry is in terms of whether the decrease
in intra-brand competition is overborne by the increase in inter-brand competition. On the
basis of different considerations, he concludes that justifications of territorial restrictions are
generally spurious.
110. See Bork, supra note 4.
111. Id. at 375.
112. Bork concentrates his inquiry on the restraint's impact on output, assuming that
price is a function of output, and quality is merely how much is put into the product-
another aspect of output.
113. Id. at 398-416.
114. Id. at 381-85.
115. Id. at 403-5.
116. See Zimmerman, supra note 3.
117. Id. at 1185. For example, it is not unusual for an item sold at Saks Fifth Avenue
and at Alexander's to cost substantially more at the former outlet. Part of this difference is
payment for the Saks Fifth Avenue image. Thus, the price of the product is somewhat
inflated.
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ing that all territorial restrictions should be per se violations of the Sherman
Act.' 18 He argues that market division not only eliminates intra-brand competi-
tion, but also deletes inter-brand price competition. Market power depends not
only on the number and relative sizes of the firms in the industry, but also on
the extent to which purchasers are willing to substitute among the competing
products. Producers try to differentiate their products in order to insulate them-
selves somewhat from price competition. 119 Where product differentiation is
based on the substantial peculiarity of the product, the overall effect may not
be entirely undesirable, since decreased price competition will be attended by
increased satisfaction of consumer wants. But where product differentiation
is a function of prestige, advertising, and other largely illusory distinctions,
it is clearly anti-competitive.120 Dealers can contribute to the manufacturer's
attempt to differentiate his produce by pursuing commercial policies directed
toward that end.' 2 ' Once freed from intra-brand competition, the dealer uses
a higher markup and obtains a greater than competitive price. Comanor
argues that manufacturers will not prevent their dealers from doing this, be-
cause that extra-competitive profit is used to create consumer preferences for
his product. 22 Manufacturers and dealers are therefore acting concertedly to
raise prices, and direct the resulting extra-competitive revenues into product
differentiation, the incentive being increased sales. 123 As product differentia-
tion increases and substitutability of products decreases, inter-brand competition
becomes style rather than price oriented. Thus, to the extent that vertical terri-
torial restraints facilitate product differentiation they are socially and economi-
cally undesirable. Comanor further maintains that market coverage is better
and resource allocation superior through the ordinary competitive market mech-
anism. 12 4 He also discounts the danger of vertical integration as a substitute
for market division, noting the diseconomies in such a switch.
C. Analysis of and Response To Extreme Approaches To Vertical
Territorial and Customer Restraints
Having examined the opposing economic arguments it is easy to see the
reasons for the existence of anomalies in the present law governing vertical ter-
118. See Comanor, supra note 2.
119. Id. at 1426.
120. Id. at 1425.
121. E.g., Through local advertising, promotion, good service, attractive showrooms,
etc., dealers can enhance a product's image.
122. See Comanor, supra note 2.
123. Id. at 1425.
124. Id. at 1430. Comanor also notes that vertical market limitations can be used to
charge different profit maximizing prices, depending on the elasticity of demand in the
given markets. But price discrimination is difficult to identify. In the economic sense it
occurs, not when there are price differentials, but when there are greater profits from some
sales than others. Since observation of visible prices is not a good enforcement technique,
and no one has the machinery to investigate and prove cost justification, it is difficult to
draw inferences one way or the other.
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ritorial and customer restraints. Strong arguments can be offered for both per
se illegality, and per se lawfulness. It is suggested that somewhere between the
polarity of approaches, a workable rubric can be devised. Any formula for deter-
mining the legality of vertical territorial and customer restraints should take into
account three major variables. Antitrust goals, the purpose and actual effect of
the restraint, and ease of judicial administration are the factors that should be
dispositive of the legal treatment of business conduct. 125
With regard to the particular arguments of Bork and Comanor, 120 it would
seem that both positions taken to their logical extreme, as they are, break down
somewhat under scrutiny. Comanor asserts that per se illegality is the proper
legal treatment for vertical territorial restraints, because they may be used to
effect product differentiation, which in turn deletes inter-brand competition. 27
There is no doubt that this argument has some merit, but it is, nevertheless,
dubious support for per se treatment of market division. Product differentiation
may be desirable insofar as it leads to satisfaction of real consumer needs. 28
If product differentiation results in price differentials it is in .most instances a
consequence of consumer preference for different products, rather than similar
products at uniform lower prices. 12 In terms of antitrust policy, it is difficult
to say whether low prices are more desirable than variety in competing products.
It is also unclear whether manufacturers generally employ territorial limitation
to decrease distribution costs, pass the savings on to consumers in the form of
decreased prices, and thereby augment sales, or as Comanor maintains charge
extra-competitive prices, and direct the increased profit margin revenues into
product differentiation, resulting in the similar effect of larger sales.130 If, as
it may well be, the purpose and effect of territorial division is some combination
of these two alternatives, the restriction does not lack any redeeming virtues,
and may well be a lawful ancillary restraint.131 Another problem with Comanor's
reasoning is the concept that product differentiation, based not upon substantial
peculiarity of the product, but upon image, effectively destroys inter-brand com-
petition and therefore should be "illegal per se." If consumers prefer products
that are widely advertised, sold in fancy showrooms, and properly serviced they
are theoretically making a reasoned choice. There is nothing, except evidence of
consumer preferences, to prevent manufacturers from increasing sales by offering
less prestigious products at lower prices. The evil is not market division, but
irrational consumer behavior. The remedy is consumer education, not elimination
125. It may be assumed that the goal of clarifying the law for businessmen will follow
from the three elements mentioned, to the extent that the law will comport with business
realities.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 110-124.
127. See Commanor, supra note 2.
128. Id. at 1423-25.
129. See Bork supra note 4.
130. See Comanor supra note 2.
131. See, e.g., Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958);
Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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of efficient distributional networks. Market limitation clearly has potential pro-
competitive, or redeeming qualities, and therefore is not properly within the
purview of an unconditional per se rule.
132
It is more difficult to respond to the opposite position to that of Comanor's,
that vertical territorial restraints should be per se lawful, because Bork's eco-
nomic argument seems technically correct. 133 He assumes that manufacturers
will seek to maximize profits by equating marginal revenue with marginal cost.134
Since market division does not affect the profit formula, it does not affect out-
put, price or quality, except to the extent that resulting efficiency has its favor-
able impact. It would seem, however, that since marginal revenue is a function
of demand, at least one of the variables in the profit formula is affected by
territorial division. On the other hand it is also apparent that marginal cost is
similarly influenced, to the extent of efficiencies resulting from market division.
Therefore, territorial restraints do affect the point where marginal revenue meets
marginal cost, and consequently affect output and price. The practical mani-
festation of this effect is difficult to predict. In a given area with a high demand,
the manufacturer may increase price, or output, or both. One factor in his deci-
sion will be elasticity of demand. If there is low substitutability of his product
with others, a manufacturer would be able to raise his price and thereby obtain
greater profits. Therefore, product differentiation that is made possible by ter-
ritorial restraints would appear to affect pricing. If, on the other hand, there is
a high elasticity of demand, a manufacturer would be able to decrease price,
(because of the efficiencies of market division), resulting in a pro-competitive
effect. Thus, in some instances, antitrust policy demands prohibition, in other
instances, acceptance of vertical territorial restraints, which rules out Bork's
per se lawfulness approach.
135
In a less technical vein, one knows on the basis of experience, that there
are industries in which intra-brand competition is vitally important. If all
dealers were to charge the same price, there would be almost no price com-
petition whatsoever in the automobile industry. No business excuse could justify
territorial restraints in this field. But in the Sckwinn situation, there were com-
132. The Schwinn Court acknowledged that the "per se" rule was not necessary to
prevent product differentiation. The Court explicitly required product interchangeability as
a prerequisite for fitting within the "rule of reason." The measure of interchangeability is
cross elasticity of demand. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380-81.
It is also difficult to understand why Comanor apparently would allow already inte-
grated firms, which do not face intra-brand competition, to use their extra-competitive
product margins to differentiate their products, but would not allow Schwinn to do the
same thing. Once again, the dichotomy is one of form, rather than substance.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 10-15.
134. See Bork, supra note 4 at 398-416.
135. If there is no price competition due to monopoly or oligopoly on the manufactur-
ing level, and there had been intra-brand price competition prior to the imposition of the
restraint, common sense requires a finding of illegality, notwithstanding technical economic
arguments to the contrary. But see Bork, supra note 4 at 398-405 for such an economic
argument.
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pelling business reasons for dividing markets.18 6 Since no concrete evidence of
anti-competitive impact was demonstrated, the decision seems indefensible. 8 7
Perhaps the explanation for Schwinn is that the Court, believing that territorial
restraints are irreconcilable with the concept of competition stressed in the
Sherman Act, deliberately selected a weak case for imposing per se illegality.
The Court might have reasoned that anyone interested in franchising will con-
clude a fortiori from Schwinn that territorial restraints will be allowed only in
very rare circumstances. They will then presumably turn to other alternatives
to achieve similar ends.188
III. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE LEGAL STATUS
oF VERTICAL TERRITORIAL RESTRAINTS
Although there are some obviously undesirable aspects to vertical territorial
restraints, there are also some commendable features. To hold per se illegality
in the Schwinn case is to ignore the language and policy underlying the per se
rule. Condemnation of conduct, based upon formal doctrine in lieu of empirical
evidence demonstrating anti-competitive purpose and effect leads to perverse
results.18 9 The weight of expert opinion is that territorial division is a practice
which ordinarily does not lack any redeeming qualities. The inflexible per se
rule for territorial restraints as formulated in Schwinn is unsatisfactory, in terms
of the rationale for per se illegality. The rationale for a per se rule is that based
on empirical evidence, experience, and logic, the likelihood of harm is so great
and of justification so slight that inquiry into the reasonableness of a practice
based on the facts in each case may fairly be forborne. The primary reason for
disdaining examination of reasonableness in each case is the Supreme Court's
inability to cope with complex, unwieldly antitrust case records.14
0
One possible vehicle for mitigating the difficulty of judicial regulation of
business is revision of the Expediting Act to allow for review by the Court of
Appeals before the Supreme Court hears the case.141 In this way, the issues will
be shaped, findings of fact verified, and excess verbiage pared away by the time
the Supreme Court hears the case. Another possibility is the creation of a spe-
cial antitrust tribunal, similar in function and operation to tax courts. Such a
court might be composed of judges having a background in economics, experi-
ence with actual recurring fact situations in the business world, and some facility
with antitrust problems. The preceding suggestions are not offered as an exclu-
sive approach to the problem of implementing and interpreting antitrust legisla-
136. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382-84 (1967) (Mr.
Justice Stewart concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. Id. at 392-94.
138. Vertical integration by ownership, and areas of primary rather than absolute
responsibility are two such alternatives.
139. See von Kalinowski, supra note 3.
140. See McLaren, supra note 9 at 168-69.
141. 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958); see also, Mr. Justice
Fortas, 30 ABA Antitrust Sec. 131 (1966).
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tion. They are merely meant to point out one way of avoiding the use of an
inflexible per se rule where business conduct requires differing regulatory treat-
ment.
Another suggested improvement on the present procedural approach to the
legal status of territorial restraints envisages a conditional "per se" rule, similar
to that in force in the European Common Market. Article 85, paragraph 1 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community stipulates that all
agreements that are liable to affect trade between Member States, and that are
designed to prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the Common Market
or which have this effect are incompatible with the Common Market. 142 But
Article 85, paragraph 3 excepts certain restraints from the ambit of paragraph 1,
where the challenged practice helps to improve the production or distribution
of goods, or to promote technical progress, while allowing consumers a fair share
of the resulting profit.14 The restrictions used must be indispensable to the
achievement of the above objectives. Such restrictions also may not eliminate
competition in respect of a substantial part of goods concerned.
144
A formula, similar to the Common Market standard above, might better
satisfy competing interests with regard to territorial restraints that are the sub-
ject of Sherman Act prosecutions. 4 5 The procedure would call for a rebuttable
presumption of illegality. The burden of rebuttal would rest on the defendant
until he can demonstrate:
A) that the challenged practice is indispensable in achieving a socially or
economically beneficial end,'146 and
B) that the ultimate effect of such practice preserves or enhances both
inter-brand competition and overall competition, and
C) that a substantial share of the resulting profits are shared by the con-
sumer.
The courts under this procedure would inquire preliminarily into the neces-
sity of the restraint. The defendant would be obliged to prove that market divi-
sion is the only way that he can meet the competition of a more powerful rival.
Therefore, a firm which controls a large share of the relevant market would
receive per se treatment summarily. In a highly competitive industry, where
no enterprise enjoys a strong advantage, a firm resorting to territorial restraints
would in most cases be unable to demonstrate business necessity, and likewise
fall within the per se rule.
142. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, adopted March 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 14.
143. See art. 85(c) Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, adopted
March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 47.
144. For an insight into the actual operation of this provision, see e.g., Hahn Exclusive
Distributorship agreements in the Common Market: Antitrust Laws on the Move. 16
Am. U. L. Rev. 367 (1967).
145. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1955).
146. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 96-100, 113, 143.
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Requisites B, and C, which necessitate proof that competition, in general,
has not been injured, and that the consumer benefits from the restraint can be
demonstrated objectively. The easiest way for a defendant to meet the above
requirements, would be to show that his product is substantially interchangeable
with rival products. By showing that his sales are highly sensitive to changes in
price of competing products, the defendant can reasonably assert that inter-
brand price competition will be enhanced as a consequence of market division.
It can be presumed that the efficiency derived from territorial division will en-
able the defendant to charge lower prices. He will be encouraged to decrease
prices in order to increase sales. Since his product is reasonably interchangeable
with others, inter-brand rivals will have to meet his lower price to avoid losing
sales. Thus, the effect on inter-brand competition is salutary.147 Since product
substitutability can be measured by cross elasticity of demand, an objective
test of how consumers respond to price changes, it would seem that the forego-
ing approach would be workable.
One difficult obstacle would then remain for the defendant, that is, to prove
that the overall effect of the restraint is pro-competitive. This calls for a show-
ing that despite the destruction of pre-existing intra-brand competition, the in-
crease in inter-brand price competition renders the total effect beneficial in terms
of antitrust goals. If hitherto intense intra-brand competition is eliminated, the
restraint is probably unlawful. If only token intra-brand competition is de-
stroyed, the restraint is probably lawful. In close cases, the defendant, having
the burden of proof, would usually fail, unless he could show a substantial in-
crease in inter-brand competition. 148 In the case of a new product, the overall
effect of territorial limitation on competition would almost always be favorable.
Although a more exact test is highly desirable, it is probably impracticable to
further delimit the inquiry into the overall effect on competition.
Where the defendant carries the burden of proof, the plaintiff can then
offer to prove that the business practice used was unreasonable, not being the
least restrictive method of achieving the desired ends. The plaintiff could also
prove that there is a trend toward concentration in the relevant market, indicat-
ing that the long run effect on inter-brand competition is actually depressive.
147. But see FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
148. It is easier to demonstrate the magnitude of decrease in intra-brand competition
than to demonstrate the degree of increase in inter-brand competition. In proving the
former, one need only point out that there was so much pre-existing competition that was
nullified. Where there used to be a number of competitors, there is now no competition at
all. In proving the latter, however, there are no visible indicators of the change in the level
of competition after the restraint. Therefore, although a defendant can prove that theo-
retically inter-brand price competition should be stimulated (as a result of efficiencies
derived from market division which allows him to decrease his prices) he probably cannot
prove how much inter-brand competition has increased. Consequently, in proving that
overall competition has been enhanced, the likelihood of a defendant's success would vary
inversely with the amount of intra-brand competition that has been eliminated. In other
words, since the degree of increase in inter-brand competition is difficult to ascertain, the in-
quiry into the impact on total competition would focus primarily on the amount of intra-
brand competition that was nullified.
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In other words, the inquiry would shift to the rule of reason rubric, with the
burden of proof of unreasonableness on the plaintiff, as it ordinarily would be.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that by means of the foregoing conditional per se approach,
the determination of the legal status of territorial restraints would be more
logical, workable and equitable than the present procedure explained in the
Schwinn case. 149 Where it is fair to do so, the courts would be able to forego
elaborate examination of business circumstances surrounding the restraint. But
where the purpose and effect of a restraint allow for an inference that the re-
straint may further the ends of antitrust, common sense and fairness militates
for a thorough inquiry into the actual effects on competition. Businessmen
would favor such a procedure, knowing that necessary business conduct toward
an acceptable end would not be arbitrarily prohibited under an inflexible per
se rule. Consumers would benefit from enhanced competition, that is presently
precluded, in those instances where territorial limitations have beneficial overall
effects. And as suggested previously, the burden on the Supreme Court of de-
ciding complicated antitrust cases could be mitigated by revision of the Expedit-
ing Act, or some similar change of procedure. It is therefore suggested that a
conditional per se approach to the legal status of vertical territorial and cus-
tomer restraints is an improvement upon the existing law and a fair compromise
among the competing interests of manufacturers, dealers, plaintiffs, courts, and
consumers.
KENNETH D. WEISS
THE NEED FOR PROTECTION OF THE CONSUMER
OF SERVICES
INTRODUCTION
A legal distinction has been made for hundreds of years between sales and
service contracts. For example, the original English Statute of Frauds,' passed
in 1677, declared itself applicable to any contract for the sale of goods worth
more than ten pounds,2 but not applicable to service contracts if the work
could be performed within one year.3 Today there exists a whole body of law
dealing with the sales contract as separate from other types of contracts. This
149. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
1. 29 Chas. 11.
2. Fuller, L., and Braucher, R., Basic Contract Law (1963) at 796.
3. Id.
